# Quasigroup-based Hybrid of a Code and a Cipher 

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#### Abstract

We construct quasigroup-based hybrid of a code and a cipher. 2000 Mathematics Subject Classification: 94A60, 20N05, $20 N 15$.


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## 1 Introduction

We construct quasigroup-based hybrid of a code and a cipher and give an algorithm that describes this construction. Some results presented in this paper are taken from [18].

Hybrid idea is sufficiently known, see, for example, [16], [17]. Following Markovski, Gligoroski, and Kocarev [9], [10], we name such hybrid as a cryptcode.

Author chooses "example" style for this paper in order to make it accessible for engineers and students.

Definition 1. A T-quasigroup $(Q, A)$ is a quasigroup of the form $A(x, y)=$ $\varphi x+\psi y+c$, where $(Q,+)$ is an abelian group, $\varphi, \psi$ are some fixed automorphisms of this group, $c$ is a fixed element of the set $Q$ [8], [15].

Theorem 1. A T-quasigroup $(Q, \cdot)$ of the form $x \cdot y=\alpha x+\beta y+c$ and a $T$ quasigroup $(Q, \circ)$ of the form $x \circ y=\gamma x+\delta y+d$, both over a group $(Q,+)$, are orthogonal if and only if the map $\alpha^{-1} \beta-\gamma^{-1} \delta$ is an automorphism of the group $(Q,+)[14]$.

Denote elements of the group $Z_{2} \oplus Z_{2}$ as follows: $\{(0 ; 0),(1 ; 0),(0 ; 1),(1 ; 1)\}$. The group $\operatorname{Aut}\left(Z_{2} \oplus Z_{2}\right)$ consists of the following automorphisms:

$$
\left(\begin{array}{ll}
1 & 0 \\
0 & 1
\end{array}\right),\left(\begin{array}{ll}
1 & 0 \\
1 & 1
\end{array}\right),\left(\begin{array}{ll}
1 & 1 \\
0 & 1
\end{array}\right),\left(\begin{array}{ll}
0 & 1 \\
1 & 0
\end{array}\right),\left(\begin{array}{ll}
1 & 1 \\
1 & 0
\end{array}\right),\left(\begin{array}{ll}
0 & 1 \\
1 & 1
\end{array}\right)
$$

Denote these automorphisms by the letters $\varepsilon, \varphi_{2}, \varphi_{3}, \varphi_{4}, \varphi_{5}, \varphi_{6}$, respectively.
Notice that $\varphi_{2}^{2}=\varphi_{3}^{2}=\varphi_{4}^{2}=\varepsilon, \varphi_{5}^{2}=\varphi_{6}, \varphi_{6}^{2}=\varphi_{5}$. It is known that $\operatorname{Aut}\left(Z_{2} \oplus Z_{2}\right) \cong S_{3}[6],[7]$.

For convenience we give Cayley table of the group $\operatorname{Aut}\left(Z_{2} \oplus Z_{2}\right)$.

| $\cdot$ | $\varepsilon$ | $\varphi_{2}$ | $\varphi_{3}$ | $\varphi_{4}$ | $\varphi_{5}$ | $\varphi_{6}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\varepsilon$ | $\varepsilon$ | $\varphi_{2}$ | $\varphi_{3}$ | $\varphi_{4}$ | $\varphi_{5}$ | $\varphi_{6}$ |
| $\varphi_{2}$ | $\varphi_{2}$ | $\varepsilon$ | $\varphi_{5}$ | $\varphi_{6}$ | $\varphi_{3}$ | $\varphi_{4}$ |
| $\varphi_{3}$ | $\varphi_{3}$ | $\varphi_{6}$ | $\varepsilon$ | $\varphi_{5}$ | $\varphi_{4}$ | $\varphi_{2}$ |
| $\varphi_{4}$ | $\varphi_{4}$ | $\varphi_{5}$ | $\varphi_{6}$ | $\varepsilon$ | $\varphi_{2}$ | $\varphi_{3}$ |
| $\varphi_{5}$ | $\varphi_{5}$ | $\varphi_{4}$ | $\varphi_{2}$ | $\varphi_{3}$ | $\varphi_{6}$ | $\varepsilon$ |
| $\varphi_{6}$ | $\varphi_{6}$ | $\varphi_{3}$ | $\varphi_{4}$ | $\varphi_{2}$ | $\varepsilon$ | $\varphi_{5}$ |

Information on codes can be found in [4].

## 2 Construction

Code part. We shall use a code given in [13, Example 19]. Let's suppose that the symbols $x, y$ are informational symbols, and the symbol $z$ is a check symbol. Remember $x, y, z \in\left(Z_{2} \oplus Z_{2}\right)$. We propose the following check equation $x+$ $\varphi_{5} y+\varphi_{6} z=(0 ; 0)$, i.e., we set the following formula to find the element $z$ :

$$
\begin{equation*}
z=\varphi_{5} x+\varphi_{6} y \tag{1}
\end{equation*}
$$

Recall, statistical investigations of J. Verhoeff [19] and D.F. Beckley [2] have shown that the most frequent errors made by human operators during data transmission are single errors (i.e. errors in exactly one component), adjacent transpositions (in other words errors made by interchanging adjacent digits, i.e. errors of the form $a b \rightarrow b a$ ), and insertion or deletion errors. If all codewords are of equal length, insertion and deletion errors can be detected easily.

Twin error is an error of the form $(a a \rightarrow b b)$. In [13] it is proved the following Theorem 2. Any $(n-1)$-T-quasigroup code $(Q, g)$ with check equation

$$
d\left(x_{1}^{n}\right)=\alpha_{1} x_{1}+\alpha_{2} x_{2}+\cdots+\alpha_{n} x_{n}=0
$$

detects:

- any transposition error on the place $(i, i+k),(i \in \overline{1, n-k}, k \in \overline{1, n-i}$, $i+k \leq n)$ if and only if the mapping $\alpha_{i}-\alpha_{i+k}$ is an automorphism of the group $(Q,+)$;
- any twin error on the place $(i, i+k),(i \in \overline{1, n-k}, k \in \overline{1, n-i}, i+k \leq n)$ if and only if the mapping $\alpha_{i}+\alpha_{i+k}$ is an automorphism of the group $(Q,+)$.
From Theorem 2 follows that the proposed code detects any transposition and twin error. The proposed code is quasigroup code, therefore it detects any single error [12], [13].

Suppose we have a word of the form $a b, a, b \in Z_{2} \oplus Z_{2}$. There exist $3 \cdot 3=9$ double errors that can be done in this word. It is easy to see that given code detects 6 errors and it cannot detect 3 double errors.

Thus this code detects 12 from theoretically possible 15 errors in any word of the form $a b, a, b \in Z_{2} \oplus Z_{2}$, i.e., it detects $80 \%$ errors in information symbols by supposition that the check symbol was transmitted without error.

Cryptographical part. We construct cryptographical part of the proposed cryptcode. For this aim we take three $T$-quasigroups over the group $Z_{2} \oplus Z_{2}$ :
$\left(Z_{2} \oplus Z_{2}, D\right)$ with the form $D(x, y)=\varphi_{3} x+\varphi_{6} y+a_{1} ;$
$\left(Z_{2} \oplus Z_{2}, E\right)$ with the form $E(x, y)=\varphi_{2} x+\varphi_{5} y+a_{2}$;
$\left(Z_{2} \oplus Z_{2}, F\right)$ with the form $F(x, y)=\varphi_{3} x+\varphi_{5} y+a_{3}$.
Lemma 1. The quasigroups $\left(Z_{2} \oplus Z_{2}, D\right),\left(Z_{2} \oplus Z_{2}, E\right)$, and $\left(Z_{2} \oplus Z_{2}, F\right)$ are orthogonal in pairs.

Proof. We can use Theorem 1 and Cayley table of the group $\operatorname{Aut}\left(Z_{2} \oplus Z_{2}\right)$.
Define three ternary operations:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& K_{1}(D(x, y), z)=D(x, y)+z \\
& K_{2}(E(x, y), z)=E(x, y)+z \\
& K_{3}(F(x, y), z)=F(x, y)+z
\end{aligned}
$$

It is clear that these operations can be replaced by a more complex system of operations.
Lemma 2. The triple of ternary operations $K_{1}(x, y, z), K_{2}(x, y, z), K_{3}(x, y, z)$ forms an orthogonal system of operation.

Proof. We solve the following system of equations

$$
\left\{\begin{array}{l}
\varphi_{3} x+\varphi_{6} y+a_{1}+z=b_{1}  \tag{2}\\
\varphi_{2} x+\varphi_{5} y+a_{2}+z=b_{2} \\
\varphi_{3} x+\varphi_{5} y+a_{3}+z=b_{3}
\end{array}\right.
$$

where $b_{1}, b_{2}, b_{3}$ are fixed elements of the set $Z_{2} \oplus Z_{2}$.
We use properties of the groups $\left(Z_{2} \oplus Z_{2}\right)$ and $\operatorname{Aut}\left(Z_{2} \oplus Z_{2}\right)$ :

$$
\left\{\begin{array}{l}
\varphi_{3} x+\varphi_{6} y+z=b_{1}+a_{1}  \tag{3}\\
\varphi_{2} x+\varphi_{5} y+z=b_{2}+a_{2} \\
\varphi_{3} x+\varphi_{5} y+z=b_{3}+a_{3}
\end{array}\right.
$$

We do the following transformations of the system (3): (first row + third row) $\rightarrow$ first row; (second row + third row) $\rightarrow$ second row; and obtain the system:

$$
\left\{\begin{array}{r}
y=b_{1}+a_{1}+b_{3}+a_{3}  \tag{4}\\
x=\varphi_{4}\left(b_{2}+a_{2}+b_{3}+b_{4}\right) \\
\varphi_{3} x+\varphi_{5} y+z=b_{3}+a_{3}
\end{array}\right.
$$

In the third equation of the system (4) we replace $x$ by $\varphi_{4}\left(b_{2}+a_{2}+b_{3}+b_{4}\right)$ and $y$ by $b_{1}+a_{1}+b_{3}+a_{3}$, obtaining:

$$
\left\{\begin{array}{r}
x=\varphi_{4}\left(b_{2}+a_{2}+b_{3}+a_{3}\right)  \tag{5}\\
y=b_{1}+a_{1}+b_{3}+a_{3} \\
z=b_{3}+a_{3}+\varphi_{5}\left(b_{1}+a_{1}+b_{2}+a_{2}\right)
\end{array}\right.
$$

Therefore, the system (2) has a unique solution for any fixed elements $b_{1}, b_{2}, b_{3} \in$ $\left(Z_{2} \oplus Z_{2}\right)$, operations $K_{1}(x, y, z), K_{2}(x, y, z), K_{3}(x, y, z)$ are orthogonal.

Triplets of orthogonal operations $K_{1}(x, y, z), K_{2}(x, y, z), K_{3}(x, y, z)$ (by $a_{1}=a_{2}=a_{3}=(0 ; 0)$ ) define on the set $Q^{3}$ permutation with the following cycle type: $1^{2} 2^{1} 4^{1} 7^{2} 14^{1} 28^{1}$, i.e., this permutation contains two cycles of order 1 , one cycle of order 2 , and so on. Denote this permutation by the letter $K$.

The order of permutation $K$ is equal to 28 . Notice that using isotopy [3], [11] or generalized isotopy [14] it is possible to change the order of permutation $K$.

We shall use the system of three ternary orthogonal groupoids $(Q, A),(Q, B)$, $(Q, C)$ of order 4 from [5].

In these tables $A(0,1,2)=A_{0}(1,2)=3, C(2,3,2)=C_{2}(3,2)=2$, and so on.

|  | 0123 |  | 0123 |  | 0123 |  | \|0123 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 0 | 0123 | 0 | 1032 | 0 | 2301 | 0 | 3210 |
| 1 | 1230 | 1 | 0123 | 1 | 3012 | 1 | 2301 |
| 2 | 2301 | 2 | 3210 | 2 | 0123 | 2 | 1032 |
| 3 | 3012 | 3 | 2301 | 3 | 1230 | 3 | 0123 |
| $B_{0}$ | 0123 | $B_{1}$ | 0123 | $B_{2}$ | 0123 | $B_{3}$ | 0123 |
| 0 | 3013 | 0 | 2110 | 0 | 1200 | 0 | 3322 |
| 1 | 0230 | 1 | 2330 | , | 2031 | 1 | 0121 |
| 2 | 1213 | 2 | 0213 | 2 | 0232 | 2 | 0203 |
| 3 | 1122 | 3 | 0031 | 3 | 3211 | 3 | 3103 |
| $C_{0}$ | 0123 | $C_{1}$ | 0123 | $\mathrm{C}_{2}$ | 0123 | $C_{3}$ | 0123 |
| 0 | 3120 | 0 | 1213 | 0 | 3300 | 0 | 2100 |
| 1 | 2112 | 1 | 1231 | 1 | 2101 | 1 | 2023 |
| 2 | 0101 | 2 | 0220 | 2 | 3320 | 2 | 3320 |
| 3 | 3123 | 3 | 1311 | 3 | 3023 | 3 | 2003 |

Denote permutation that defines this system of three ternary orthogonal groupoids by the letter $M, M=M(A(x, y, z), B(x, y, z), C(x, y, z))$. This permutation has the following cycle type: $1^{1} 17^{1} 20^{1} 26^{1}$. The order of this permutation is equal to $17 \cdot 20 \cdot 13=4420$.

In order to use the system of orthogonal groupoids and the system of orthogonal $T$-quasigroups simultaneously we redefine the basic set of the $T$-quasigroups in the following (non-unique) way: $(0 ; 0) \rightarrow 0,(1 ; 0) \rightarrow 1,(0 ; 1) \rightarrow 2,(1 ; 1) \rightarrow 3$.

We propose the following cryptographical term (a cryptographical primitive):

$$
\begin{equation*}
H(x, y, z)=M^{k}\left(K^{l}(x, y, z)\right), k, l \in \mathbb{Z} \tag{6}
\end{equation*}
$$

The transformation $H$ is a permutation of the set $Q^{3}$. Indeed, this transformation is a composition of two permutations: $K^{l}$ and $M^{k}$.
Remark 1. It is possible to use the following cryptographical procedure:

$$
H_{1}(x, y, z)=K^{t}\left(M^{k}\left(K^{l}(x, y, z)\right)\right), t, k, l \in \mathbb{Z}
$$

and so on.

## 3 Algorithm

We propose the following
Algorithm 1 1. Take a pair of information symbols $a, b \in\left(Z_{2} \oplus Z_{2}\right)$;
2. using formula (1) (or its analogue), find value of the check symbol $c$;
3. apply the cryptographical term $H$ to the triple $(a, b, c)$;
4. therefore, we obtain first three elements of the cipher-text;
5. take a pair of information symbols $d, e \in\left(Z_{2} \oplus Z_{2}\right)$;
6. using formula (1), find value of the check symbol $f$;
7. change values of the numbers $k, l$ in the cryptographical term $H$; also it is possible to change the term $H$ by other term of such or other type;
8. apply the cryptographical term $H$ to the triple $(d, e, f)$;
9. we obtain next three elements of the cipher-text;
10. and so on.

Remark 2. At Step 7 of Algorithm 1 it is possible to use ideas of Feistel schema. Namely, it is possible to calculate the numbers $k, l$ using some bijective functions, where the numbers of triplet $H(a, b, c)$ and previous values of $k$ and $l$ are used as arguments.

Decoding. Using permutations $K^{-1}$ and $M^{-1}$, we can construct corresponding triplets of orthogonal 3 -ary groupoids and so on.

Resistance relative to some possible attacks. Taking into consideration Remark 1, we can estimate the number of possible keys in the presented cryptcode. This number is equal to (64!). Length of any key is equal to $64 \cdot 3 \cdot 2=384$ bits.

At each step of the proposed algorithm only three symbols (six bits) are ciphered. Moreover, after any step this key can be changed. Therefore, bruteforce attack is difficult.

Statistical attack also seems to be difficult. It is possible to present the following argument: the symmetric group $S_{64}$ acts on the set, which consists from 64 triplets 64 -transitively [7].

A code-crypt algorithm. Denote the coding procedure from Algorithm 1 as $C(x, y)$ since this procedure is a function of two variables. Therefore, we can describe procedures of coding and enciphering in Algorithm 1 by the following formula:

$$
\begin{equation*}
H(x, y, C(x, y)), \tag{7}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $H$ is taken from equation (6). It is possible to construct a code-crypt algorithm by the formula $C_{1}(H(x, y, z))$ since there exists a possibility to use an analogue of the code $C$ for three information symbols [13, Example 19], i.e., we can transpose the procedures $C$ and $H$.

Conclusion. Almost all constructions in this paper are performed over the field $G F\left(2^{2}\right)$. An analog of Algorithm 1 can be constructed over a field of the order more than four. Also we can use an alternating more powerful code [1].
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